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          CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA: THE FRACTURED EVIDENCE  
 STANDARD FOR PROVING A SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST  
 
           Christopher A. Khatami 
 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
 Fractured cases make bad evidence law.  In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda,
1
 the United 
States Supreme Court achieved minor success in clarification.  The Alameda Court’s plurality 
opinion created a more concrete analytic framework in which to view both parties’ evidence, but 
produced an opaque rule as to how a court should determine the sufficiency of that evidence.
2
  
Alameda generated more sophisticated evidence questions than it laid to rest in response to the 
inchoate reasonable-relevance standard established in Renton for proving a substantial 
governmental interest.
3
  A fractured Alameda opinion and unclear evidence rules created 
conflicting lower court interpretations, causing circuit courts to render its own interpretative 
judgment where the Alameda Court failed to clarify.  
 Lower courts have split over key evidence questions.
4
  The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are 
divided over whether studies with a longer shelf life, often having tested for unrelated secondary 
effects, constitute “shoddy data or reasoning” under Alameda.5 Another circuit split in the wake 
of Alameda turns on whether a city can rely only on pre-enactment data or can the city rely on 
                                                 
1
 535 U.S. 425 (2002).  
2
 Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger, James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of 
Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741, 755 (2009) (finding 
that lower courts agree that Alameda’s evidence standard does not require local governments to rely on Daubert-
quality scientific evidence or studies, but that there is no lower court consensus or guidance from Alameda as to the 
weight or form of evidence sufficient to “cast direct doubt” on legislative findings that support the government’s 
secondary effects justification for state regulation of adult businesses). 
3
 Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, supra note 2, at 755.   
4
 Id. at 750. 
5
 Brigman L. Harman, Is a Strip Club More Harmful Than a Dirty Bookstore? Navigating a Circuit Split in 
Municipal Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1603, 1604–06 (2008) (noting that the 
Fifth Circuit has interpreted “shoddy data or reasoning” under Alameda to mean that cities cannot rely on “studies 
that do not differentiate between on-site sexually oriented businesses and off-site sexually oriented businesses.”).  
The Tenth Circuit, on the contrary, has read “shoddy data or reasoning” more conservatively.  Id.  Under the Tenth 
Circuit’s view, the plaintiff retains the burden of rebutting the presumption that on-site and off-site sexually oriented 
businesses are “‘reasonably similar businesses’ that will have reasonably similar effects.”  This circuit split will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this paper.  Id.  
2 
 
data compiled after enactment of the ordinance.
6
 Still another division answered differently 
within the same circuit hinges on whether foreign studies “trump actual local experience 
measured with reliable statistics?”7  More post-Alameda questions still persist: the extent of 
judicial deference to legislative evidence and the evidentiary weight to be afforded local 
scientific studies in comparison to older anecdotal accounts from other jurisdictions which “may 
or may not have much in common with the community at issue.”8 
 The Alameda Court succeeded, however, in creating a burden-shifting mechanism and a 
balancing test designed to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to rebut the city’s asserted evidence of 
secondary effects at the summary judgment stage of litigation.
9
  The balancing test sought to 
create a boundary framework to address First Amendment concerns raised in Justice Souter’s 
dissent in Alameda.
10
  
  Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the burden shifting standard failed to articulate with 
greater precision and clarity the weight and form of evidence that cities are required to produce 
in support of the link between asserted secondary effects and the ordinance’s restrictions.11 Only 
spare mention of “shoddy data or reasoning” is offered as the blanket standard for unpalatable 
government evidence.
12
  The plurality opinion, however, jettisoned elaboration of any kind as to 
the types of evidence constituting “shoddy data or reasoning.”13   
 Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s balancing test took a different analytical approach to reach 
the same conclusion with the same evidentiary flaws as the plurality opinion.  The concurrence 
                                                 
6
 Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, supra note 2, at 756–58 (noting that the “timing of secondary effects evidence 
has also hopelessly divided the Courts.”) Some courts have concluded that the government must produce all 
evidence relied upon at any time and at any stage of the litigation.  Id at 758.  Other courts, however, have held that 
the city must produce all evidence “made at the time of legislative enactment.” These circuit cases and the timing of 
evidence issue will be discussed in Part IV of this paper.  Id.  
7
 Id. at 756.  
8
 Id. at 753–55.  
9
 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002) (plurality opinion).  
10
 Id. at 446 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
11
 Id. at 437 (plurality opinion).   
12
 Id.   
13
 Id.  
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also failed to articulate the weight of evidence and the form of evidence required to be produced 
under Alameda.  The burden-shifting mechanism fits hand in glove with the balancing test, but 
neither approach has proven instructive to lower courts on crucial evidence rules at the trial level.   
 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have read Alameda as permitting considerable judicial 
deference to legislative findings of asserted secondary effects in a line of cases to be discussed 
further in this paper.  A much more recent Seventh Circuit decision in Annex Books, Inc. v. City 
of Indianapolis,
14
 however, retrenched a hitherto expansive reading of what evidence sufficiently 
sustained an adult zoning ordinance.   
 The Annex Court rejected the city’s reliance on a data from a pre-enactment study 
conducted twenty years prior that tested for secondary effects unrelated to the ordinance at 
issue.
15
  Applying the burden-shift and balancing approaches, the Annex Court read Alameda’s 
“shoddy data or reasoning” standard as including data from studies unrelated to the asserted 
secondary effects.
16
  Annex, in other words, undergirded evidentiary sufficiency with the 
requirement that proffered evidence must be at least comparably related to the types of land-use 
externalities produced by operation of adult businesses.   
 This paper argues that the Alameda Court’s fractured opinion left the sufficiency of 
evidence standard an unsettled area of law susceptible to unbridled legislative justifications for 
invasive adult zoning restrictions unrelated to purported secondary effects.  Part II of this paper 
examines the broader constitutional landscape from which the sufficiency of evidence standard 
and the stakes surrounding it emerged. Part III provides a case analysis of Alameda, scrutinizes 
the three contending approaches of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.  Part IV analyzes 
evidentiary issues raised in Alameda that caused circuit splits and whether the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
14
 581 F.3d 460, 461–63 (7th Cir. 2009).  
15
 Id. at 461.  
16
 Id. at 464–66.  
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decision in Annex constituted a game-changer for evidentiary sufficiency.  Part V briefly argues 
that an evidence rule of comparable relatedness to asserted secondary effects is a vital safeguard 
that precludes city councils from abusing studies and other data to support unrelated ordinances 
in the name of combating secondary effects.  Lastly, Part VI concludes that Alameda’s fogginess 
empowers city councils to surmount First Amendment challenges without allowing plaintiff-
business owners the benefit of making their case for constitutional defect beyond the summary 
judgment stage of litigation. 
II.   Constitutional Framework: Zoning Regulation of Adult Businesses and the First Amendment 
 State zoning regulation of adult businesses is a creature of nuisance law.  State and 
municipal governments retain broad zoning authority to regulate adult business establishments 
subject to certain First Amendment limitations.
17
 First Amendment limitation on state police 
power encompasses protection over a “wide variety of ‘expressive conduct,’ including adult 
entertainment.”18  Supreme Court decisions have consistently extended First Amendment 
protections to adult books, sexually explicit movies, and live adult entertainment.
19
   
 The ambit of First Amendment protection of adult businesses in zoning and non-zoning 
cases alike has been frustrated by analytical difficulties in drawing sharp pliable distinctions 
                                                 
17
 See, e.g., Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971) (holding that zoning regulations must be content-neutral in their 
application and not infringe on speech protected by the First Amendment); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941) (holding that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon First Amendment speech are permissible 
as long as the regulations are administered fairly); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
(holding that the state’s police power is broad enough to allow government zoning regulation that segregates 
industrial company sites from residential areas of the community); see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint 
Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 451 (2004) (explaining that the 
recognized power of local governments to enact zoning ordinances to combat nuisances has been broadly interpreted 
by the Supreme Court to include zoning for aesthetic reasons, improvements to neighborhood quality and urban life, 
reduction in noise, traffic, and crime, and protection of public morals); Kenneth L. Turchi, Note, Municipal Zoning 
Restrictions on Adult Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis’ Special Exception Ordinance, 58 IND. 
L.J. 505, 506–10 (1983) (describing constitutional background for state zoning regulatory authority over businesses 
in the community and the basic limits of that regulatory authority as it confronts, generally speaking, First 
Amendment concerns).  
18
 Baradaran-Robison, supra note 17, at 451.  
19
 See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (citing a litany of prior Supreme Court cases 
that recognized extensions of First Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech through a variety of 
communicative mediums such as television, radio, print, and live entertainment).  
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between expressive conduct and speech content.
20
  The Supreme Court first confronted this 
conduct-content bifurcation in U.S. v. O’Brien.21  The facts of O’Brien, however, do not lend 
themselves to easy analogy in the context of zoning adult businesses.  O’Brien involved three 
defendants who burned their “Selective Service registration certificates,” or draft cards, on the 
steps of a local city courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War and in violation of a 1965 
amendment to a federal statute.
22
  The statutory amendment imposed criminal liability on anyone 
who “‘knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates’” a draft card.23  
 The defendants challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the act 
or conduct of burning a draft card in public fell within the First Amendment’s protection of free 
expression “because [the defendants] did it in ‘demonstration against the war and against the 
draft.’”24 The Supreme soundly rejected the notion that all conduct containing a communicative 
element that could be labeled as speech received First Amendment protection.
25
 Speech and non-
speech elements combined in the same course of conduct are still subject to incidental First 
Amendment limitations if the restrictive law meets a four-part test adopted by the O’Brien 
Court.
26
  
 Government regulation of expressive conduct is “sufficiently justified” if: 1) it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; 2) if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; 3) if it the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and 4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
                                                 
20
 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
“[a]dult speech refers not merely to sexually explicit content, but to speech reflecting a favorable view of being 
explicit about sex and a favorable view of the practices it depicts”); see also Philip J. Prygoski, Content Neutrality 
and Levels of Scrutiny in First Amendment Zoning Cases, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2003). 
21
 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
22
 Id.   
23
 Id. at 374.  
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
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than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”27  Although the Court categorized the 
defendant’s conduct as expressive, it concluded that Congress retained the proper authority to 
pass a draft card burning statute under its Article I constitutional power to raise armies.
28
  In 
addition, the government’s substantial interest resided in furthering “the smooth and proper 
functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies.”29 The draft card burning 
statute protects the government’s capability to control a functioning military conscription system 
essential to national defense.
30
  Accordingly, the draft card burning statute is unrelated to 
suppressing any speech aspect of the conduct and the Court “perceived no reasonable alternative 
means that would more precisely and narrowly” assure the functional viability of the draft 
system.
31
 
 O’Brien essentially provided that government regulation of expressive conduct is 
content-neutral if the government can meet each prong of the four-part test.
32
  The factors in the 
O’Brien test for expressive conduct statutes are closely analogous to the multi-factor analysis the 
Supreme Court developed for determining whether zoning ordinances are content-based or 
content-neutral.
33
  Unlike the O’Brien Court’s clear adoption of a test to determine a statute’s 
                                                 
27
 Id. at 374–77.  
28
 Id. at 377. 
29
 Id. at 379.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 379–81. 
32
 Interestingly, by contrast, the Supreme Court refused to apply the four-part O’Brien test to a Congressional flag 
burning statute in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), finding that the flag burning ban was content-based and 
subject to strict scrutiny despite the fact that the act of flag burning was expressive conduct that would otherwise 
come under O’Brien. See Dana M. Tucker, Preventing The Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment 
Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383, 395 (1987). 
33
 Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, 
and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2002) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has “commented that the tests regarding time, place, and manner restrictions and expressive 
conduct restrictions are nearly identical, and appears to use them interchangeably with only minor amounts of 
difficulty”).  It is important to note, however, that the majority opinions have applied the Renton test to zoning cases 
only, and applied the O’Brien test to expressive conduct cases involving public indecency statutes banning nude 
dancing a la Barnes and Erie. Where the different tests seem to converge is in the Court’s application of the 
secondary effects doctrine as legal justification for expressive conduct statutes regulating adult businesses.  
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content-neutrality, however, the Supreme Court hiccupped twice before it developed a multi-
factor test similar to O’Brien.   
 Confronted with its first adult zoning case in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
34
 the 
Court sharply divided over the proper standard of review and whether the enterprise of adult 
zoning was content-based or content-neutral.
35
  The facts in Young stood in stark contrast to the 
antiwar political speech in the act of draft card burning in O’Brien.  In Young, two adult movie 
theater owners challenged on First Amendment grounds Detroit’s zoning ordinance that 
prevented concentration of adult businesses within a 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet 
of any residential area.
36
 
 At the time of enactment, the Detroit city council made a finding that “some uses of 
property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited 
areas.”37  Based upon this legislative evidence, the city decided to pass the ordinance.  
Subsequently, the city passed several amendments, the most important of which prevented 
clusters of adult businesses from operating within a certain range of each other.
38
  The plaintiffs 
argued that the recent amendments to the ordinance offended First Amendment protected speech 
given that the ordinance aimed directly at movie theaters exhibiting sexually explicit films.
39
  
The plaintiffs further argued that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as it applied restrictions to adult movie theaters only based on the 
sexually explicit content of the films being shown at the theater.
40
  
 The Court upheld the ordinance and classified the land-use restriction as a content-
neutral, constitutionally benign time, place, and manner regulation subject to intermediate 
                                                 
34
 427 U.S. 50 (1976).  
35
 See Andrew, supra note 33, at 1183.  
36
 Young, 427 U.S. at 52–53.  
37
 Id. at 54.  
38
 Id. at 53. 
39
 Id. at 55.  
40
 Id. at 57.  
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scrutiny.
41
  Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he mere fact that the 
commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and 
other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.”42 The 
fact that the ordinance treated adult theaters differently and classified them based on the content 
they exhibited also proved to be of little consequence to the plurality.
43
  Justice Stevens 
distinguished the regulatory aims from the regulatory means of the ordinance.
44
   The plurality 
concluded that land-use regulations governing the time, location, and manner of operations 
pertaining to a particular kind of business does not violate the First Amendment if the city can 
demonstrate a significant governmental interest in combating purported secondary effects 
produced by operation of these adult businesses.
45
   
 Secondary effects became the constitutional end-run around persuasive arguments raised 
in Justice Stewart’s dissent that adult zoning regulated adult businesses for its content above all 
and that secondary effects obfuscated a clear distinction between content-based and content-
neutral ordinances.
46
   Accordingly, Justice Stewart argued that adult zoning constituted content-
based regulation that demanded subjection to strict scrutiny.
47
  Justice Powell’s concurrence, on 
the other hand, agreed with the plurality on content-neutrality, but viewed the ordinance as 
regulating the conduct of how adult movie theaters operate in a community.
48
  Thus, the 
ordinance, under Justice Powell’s analysis, should be analyzed under the four-part O’Brien test.49   
 The plurality passed on the O’Brien test and applied the significant governmental interest 
standard as the constitutional benchmark that cities must prove to sustain an adult zoning 
                                                 
41
 Id. at 61.  
42
 Id. 
43
 Id.  
44
 Id. at 67.  
45
 Id. at 61.  
46
 Id. at 83–87.  
47
 Id. at 85–86. 
48
 Id. at 78–83. 
49
 Id. at 80. 
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regulation.
50
  The city’s interest in protecting its community from negative externalities 
generated by concentrations of adult movie theaters cloaked the ordinance in a content-neutral 
garb free from the glare of strict scrutiny.
51
 The plurality further concluded that the findings of 
the Detroit city council’s study provided a sufficient factual basis “for the [city council’s] 
conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect.
52
  The study findings of 
purported secondary effects, in other words, proved the city’s significant interest in preserving 
the quality of neighborhoods in the community through zoning regulation of adult businesses.
53
  
 The plurality in Young created several key components of the undeveloped evidence 
standard that would confront the Alameda Court years later:  Judicial deference to legislative 
evidence,
54
 data proffered from legislative studies to support secondary effects,
55
 the notion of 
secondary effects as a doctrinal basis for characterizing zoning ordinances as content neutral,
56
 
and the city’s burden of proving a significant interest to sustain the constitutionality of the 
ordinance.
57
  The plurality decision in Young, however, confounded the lower courts.
58
  Lower 
courts struggled to articulate a clear standard of review as the doctrinal breadth and evidentiary 
scope of the secondary effects justification clouded hitherto starker distinctions between content-
based and content-neutral ordinances.
59
  Justice Powell’s characterization of time, place, and 
                                                 
50
 Id. at 70–72.  
51
 Id. at 70. 
52
 Id.   
53
 Id. at 71; see also Andrew, supra note 33, at 1184.  
54
 Id. at 71. 
55
 Id. at 71 n.34.  
56
 Id. at 71. 
57
 Id. at 70–73. 
58
 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1186. 
59
 Ronald M. Stein, Regulation of Adult Businesses Through Zoning After Renton, 18 PAC. L.J. 351, 361 (1987) 
(noting that “‘the lack of a clearly articulated standard in Stevens’ plurality decision’” confused lower courts causing 
Justice Powell’s O’Brien analysis to be largely followed by federal courts)(quoting Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511 F. 
Supp. 1207, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).  
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manner regulations as conduct-based and his invocation of the O’Brien test only compounded 
lower courts’ perplexity.60   
 Five years after Young, the Supreme Court in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
61
 
refined its secondary effects analysis and reigned in the seemingly expansive writ of zoning 
authority over adult businesses.
62
  In Schad, two adult bookstore owners were criminally indicted 
and convicted for violating a local zoning ordinance that banned all live entertainment as a 
permitted use in a commercial zone.
63
  The owners challenged the ordinance as violative of their 
rights of free expression under the First Amendment.
64
  The bookstore sold sexually explicit 
books, magazines, and films.
65
  In 1973, the bookstore obtained an “amusement” license from 
the Borough, permitting the store to install coin-operated video booths in which customers could 
pay to watch adult films on the commercial retail premises.
66
  Three years later, in 1976, the 
store installed a coin-operated live nude dancing booth in which customers could pay to view a 
live nude dancer gyrating behind a glass panel.
67
    
 The Schad Court attacked the blatant ambiguity in the language of the statute and its 
application.  Borough officials’ conflicting interpretation of the extent of entertainment banned 
under the ordinance highlighted the ambiguity.
68
  The prosecutor construed the ordinance as 
banning all live entertainment, but the Borough building inspector “stated there was no basis for 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 361.  
61
 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
62
 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187. 
63
 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62–64 (1981).  § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim’s ordinance listed 
permitted uses on land and in buildings.  The list included: offices, banks, taverns, restaurants, luncheonettes, 
automobile dealerships, and retail stores, “such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, 
hardware, lumber, jewelry paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers” . . . etc.  Id. at 64.  The list did not expressly 
mention exclusion of sexually oriented retail businesses.  Id.  As Justice White points out in the plurality opinion, 
the language of the ordinance is “ambiguous with respect to whether live entertainment is permitted.”  Id. at 66.  The 
ordinance purports to list the “principal” permitted uses in a commercial zone, yet at the same time in a subsequent 
provision of the ordinance § 99-4 “declares that all uses not expressly permitted are forbidden.”  Id. at 67.  
64
 Id. at 65.  
65
 Id. at 62. 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. at 68.  
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distinguishing between live entertainment and other entertainment under the ordinance.”69  The 
Borough issued the amusement license to the adult bookstore, which permitted the live 
entertainment toll booths in the first place.
70
 
 The Court seized upon the ordinance’s ambiguity to raise the evidentiary burden upon 
states to prove a substantial governmental interest.
71
  The Schad Court expounded upon the 
rough outlines of the evidentiary standard in Young.  First, the Court acknowledged that the 
courts assumed the critical role of weigh the circumstances and appraising the “substantiality of 
the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.”72  Second, the Court required the government 
to provide evidence of the secondary effects that the ordinance purported to mitigate before the 
law could survive intermediate scrutiny.
73
  Third, overbroad zoning regulations that operated as 
either an express or an effective total ban on expressive speech constituted an unreasonable time, 
place, and manner regulation.
74
   On this point, the Court added that zoning regulations 
implicating First Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored or drawn to further the state’s 
substantial governmental interest and leave open “adequate alternative channels of 
communication.”75 
                                                 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 62.  
71
 Id. at 68.  
72
 Id. at 69. 
73
 Id. at 69–75. 
74
 Id. at 74–76.  
75
 Id. at 75–76; see also Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex, But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, The First 
Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 648–54 (2005) (making the astute 
observation that an alternative fair reading of Schad suggests that a total ban may “still be permissible in rural and 
residential communities” since the Court “explicitly declined to hold that every municipality, no matter how small, 
must allow such entertainment.”).   The author notes “an unresolved conflict” between Renton and Schad  regarding 
the available alternative avenues of communication requirement.  Renton requires that municipal zoning regulations 
provide space for adult businesses within the city’s borders.  Schad suggests, on the other hand, that small rural or 
residential communities may not have to preserve zoning space within its borders to meet the alternative avenues 
communication when other adult businesses are nearby but outside the municipality’s borders.  Id. at 654. This 
unclear standard for available alternative avenues of communication requirement is an important component of First 
Amendment zoning jurisprudence, but beyond the scope of this note. 
12 
 
 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence amplified the plurality’s articulation of the state’s 
heightened evidentiary burden.
76
   The state must be prepared, Justice Blackmun wrote, “to 
articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis for its decision.”77  Further, the city 
cannot rely on access to adult businesses in neighboring locales to satisfy the court’s concern 
with available alternative avenues of communication.
78
   
 Justice Stevens, the plurality opinion author in Young, wrote a concurrence in Schad that 
shed new and interesting light in terms of the city’s evidentiary burden under Young and the 
constitutional parameters of how a state may justify future assertions of restrictive zoning 
authority over adult businesses.
79
  In particular, Justice Stevens’ concurrence zeros in on the 
content-neutrality issue that raised analytical difficulties for lower courts in applying Young.
80
  
Narrowly tailored or drawn regulations, Justice Stevens’ argument implicitly acknowledged, 
reigned in the issue of overbroad ordinances, but also raised the opposite issue of ordinances 
narrowly drawn on the basis of content.
81
   
 The Borough could overcome over breadth charges by “showing that its ordinances were 
narrowly drawn and furthered ‘a sufficiently substantial governmental interest.’”82  Justice 
Stevens reasoned further that both the ambiguous ordinance language and a destitute evidentiary 
record demonstrating that the adult business created an “identifiable adverse impact on the 
neighborhood or on the Borough as a whole” proved fatal to the ordinance’s constitutional 
validity.
83
  The municipal regulation could be sustained, in other words, if the ordinance 
language is clear and narrowly focused on mitigating asserted secondary effects, the existence of 
                                                 
76
 Schad, 452 U.S. at 77. 
77
 Id.  
78
 Id. at 78. 
79
 Id. at 79. 
80
 Id. at 83–84. 
81
 Id.  
82
 Id. at 79.  
83
 Id. at 83. 
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which is supported by evidence.  “Unbridled discretion of a municipal official” did not satisfy 
the evidentiary burden created in Young and refined in Schad.
84
   
 The Schad Court left it up to subsequent courts to elaborate on the type or amount of 
evidence that either the government or the plaintiffs could adduce at trial.  Young and Schad 
marked a clear swing of the pendulum.
85
  States could use its zoning power to regulate adult 
businesses without the presumption of content-discrimination if the government premised its 
ordinance on ameliorating alleged secondary effects or negative externalities produced by 
operation of adult businesses.
86
  States could not, on the other hand, simply ban all adult 
businesses from a commercial district or merely assert that the ordinance combated secondary 
effects and pass constitutional muster.
87
  The state must produce evidence.
88
  Part of that 
evidentiary burden included clear ordinance language that corresponded to proffered evidence of 
secondary effects, which rooted the ordinance’s legitimacy in a significant governmental 
interest.
89
   
 Lower courts heeded Schad’s tougher evidentiary burden on the government.90  The 
Eighth and Sixth Circuits in particular read the Supreme Court’s Schad opinion as a heightened 
evidentiary standard for proving that the ordinance aimed at combating secondary effects caused 
by the adult business location and not the content of the speech itself.
91
  Lower courts also 
scrutinized the government’s motivation in passing the ordinance as a factor in their evidentiary 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 84. 
85
 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187.  
86
 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 U.S. 50, 52–53 (1976). 
87
 Schad, 452 U.S. at 75–76. 
88
 Id. at 76. 
89
 Id. at 76. 
90
 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187–88. 
91
 See Avalon v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the ordinance was content-based and 
subject to strict scrutiny because the state produced insufficient evidence to justify a local dispersal ordinance 
similar to the one in Young); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding 
that the ordinance was content-based for lack of sufficient evidence that the regulation aimed at combating 
purported secondary effects).  
14 
 
analysis in the wake of Schad.
92
  Lower courts clearly interpreted Schad as sculpting reinforced 
evidentiary boundaries out of a vague and confusing mold in Young.   
 The disparate application of the evidentiary burden among lower courts, however, 
reflected the competing interests that the Supreme Court enlisted itself to balance in Schad.
93
  
Without a clear framework in hand, two different circuits could view an identically worded 
ordinance but reach opposite conclusions in light of how a particular court interpreted the 
evidence offered by the government.
94
  Elements of the Court’s evidence standard for proving a 
significant governmental interest were taking shape. The Supreme Court utilized its subsequent 
decision in Renton to reign in lower courts’ analysis of the government’s motivation in 
enactment of an adult zoning ordinance and to translate the Young and Schad decisions into a 
coherent framework of analysis.
95
   
 If Schad constituted an increase in the government’s evidentiary burden, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.96 abruptly dispelled that 
interpretation.
97
  The Renton Court’s opinion set to accomplish three objectives: clarification of 
its secondary effects rationale in Young, foreclosure of the government’s motivation in enacting 
the ordinance as a factor in lower courts’ analysis, and clear consensus articulation of the proper 
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formulation of the government’s evidentiary burden that proved elusive in the Court’s Young and 
Schad opinions.
98
   
 In Renton, two adult theater owners challenged the City of Renton’s preexisting zoning 
ordinance that prohibited any adult motion picture theater from “locating within 1,000 feet of 
any residential zone, single-, or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of 
any school.”99  The City Council predicated its decision to pass the dispersal ordinance upon 
several modes of informational evidence.  The ordinance became law after several public 
hearings, review of data from other cities regarding the negative externalities of adult businesses 
upon the community, and a recommendation to pass the ordinance from both the City Attorney’s 
Office and the city’s Planning and Development Committee.100  The ordinance defined adult 
movie theaters broadly to include “ ‘[a]n enclosed building used for preventing motion picture 
films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or 
[characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘specified sexual 
activities’ or ‘specified anatomical areas’…for observation by patrons therein.’”101  
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wasted no time establishing the Renton 
ordinance as identical in language, scope, and constitutional character with the dispersal zoning 
law in Young.
102
 Drawing a direct analogy with Young’s ordinance set the stage for the Renton 
Court’s amplified explanation of the proper constitutional analysis of time, place, and manner 
regulations.  First, the ordinance is properly analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation 
since it do not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely places restrictions on how, where, and 
when the adult theater can operate.
103
  The time, place, and manner character of the Renton 
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ordinance made it content-neutral subject to intermediate scrutiny, the Court explained, provided 
the government could show that the design of a given ordinance served “a substantial 
governmental interest and allow[ed] for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”104  
This formulation addressed both the significant governmental interest prong in Young and the 
narrow tailoring requirement in Schad.   
 Second, the Court next addressed the sufficiency of evidence burden upon the 
government for proving a substantial governmental interest.
105
  Relying on its secondary effects 
rationale in Young, the majority in Renton accorded “high respect” or high judicial deference to 
legislative attempts to combat asserted secondary effects of adult businesses in the form of 
restrictive zoning laws.
106
  City governments, the Court elaborated, must have “a reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”107  The Court 
dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the city’s “justifications for the ordinance were 
‘conclusory and speculative’ since the Renton ordinance was passed “without the benefit of 
studies specifically relating to ‘the particular problems or needs of Renton.’”108   
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Renton, concluded that the state “was 
entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the ‘detailed 
findings’ summarized in the Washington Supreme Court’s  Northend Cinema opinion, in 
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enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance.”109  The First Amendment, the Court added, “does 
not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence 
independent of that already generated by other cities.”110  The next line etched Renton’s evidence 
standard into First Amendment zoning jurisprudence: “so long as whatever evidence the city 
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”111  
Reliance, reasonableness, and relevance became the flashpoints of confusion and debate among 
the lower courts as to the extent of evidence sufficient to “justify reliance by a city and support a 
reasonable belief that the ordinance targeted secondary effects.”112   
  The Renton Court’s decision, put another way, constituted a constitutional patchwork of 
prongs from Young and Schad with an inchoate sufficiency of evidence standard that, on its face, 
appeared to permit all manner of evidence a city government could proffer in the name of 
combating secondary effects.  The Renton Court extended the secondary effects reasoning in 
Young by holding that a city may rely on the studies of other cities, or detailed findings in 
judicial opinions from other courts, as opposed to conducting its own studies.
113
  
 Young’s secondary effects doctrine became an evidentiary proxy for proving a substantial 
governmental interest under Renton.
114
 Government could cherry pick bias, and in some cases 
wholly distinguishable and irrelevant, data to support its justification for passing the 
ordinance.
115
  More to the point, Justice Brennan’s dissent also zeroed in on the fact that some of 
the findings in the government’s evidence “do not relate to supposed ‘secondary effects’ 
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associated with adult movie theaters.”116  Besides reliance on incomparable evidence, the Court, 
Justice Brennan insisted, “cannot, as it does, merely accept these post hoc statements at face 
value.”117  Citing to Schad, Justice Brennan’s argument strongly indicated that the narrow 
tailoring requirement in Schad demanded that governments adduce evidence comparable, or at 
the very least, related to, the purported secondary effects that the ordinance aimed to mitigate.
118
  
 Before giving a plaintiff the opportunity to challenge the government’s evidence or to 
offer evidence in front of a jury, the Renton Court, ironically, concludes that courts are in the 
best position to judge whether a particular plaintiff-adult business lodges sufficient legal 
arguments to strike down a particular city’s zoning ordinance under an intermediate standard of 
scrutiny, which “reduces a city’s burden to justify its regulation.”119 
 In the wake of Renton’s expansive evidence rule, some lower courts imposed certain 
minimum requirements on official in city government such as the requirement that the 
government can rely only on data or evidence utilized before the ordinance’s enactment.120  
Other lower courts enforced Renton’s evidence standard with full force, holding that the 
government can rely on evidence or date obtained before or after the ordinance’s passage.121  
This nascent timing of evidence issue remains an unresolved legal issue even after the Court’s 
decision in Alameda.   
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 The third and final major legal issue that the Renton Court addressed turned on whether 
an adult zoning ordinance was intrinsically content-based.  Armed with the Schad Court’s 
narrow tailoring requirement as caution against overbroad ordinances, lower courts increasingly 
considered the government’s motivation in passing an adult business ordinance.122  This 
motivation factor clearly reflected lower court concerns that content-based restrictions could be 
easily justified as content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations combating alleged 
secondary effects.   
 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Renton gave superior judicial voice to that consideration. 
Justice Brennan wrote incisively that even if the ordinance legitimately aimed at combating real 
secondary effects, it does not necessarily “mean, however, that such regulations are content-
neutral.”123  The fact the ordinances are directed at legitimate legislative aims does not change 
the fact that government passes ordinances imposing special restrictions because of the speech 
content, not in spite of it.
124
  Justice Brennan’s constitutional sentiments echoed the Ninth 
Circuit’s position that the city’s could not rely on unrelated data from other studies of cities with 
different problems and needs from Renton to prove a governmental interest.  
 The majority in Renton disagreed with Justice Brennan and the Ninth Circuit.  The Court 
dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s O’Brien analysis regarding the city’s motivation as a factor in 
determining whether the ordinance is content-neutral.
125
  The majority concluded that alleged 
legislative motives created an unfair and unjustifiably high threshold for city governments to 
overcome.
126
  Therefore, the Court adopted the “predominate concerns”127 test as a buffer against 
lower court analysis of governmental motivations in passing an ordinance.  This way the 
                                                 
122
 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189–90. 
123
 Renton, 475 U.S. at 934. 
124
 Id. at 934–37.  
125
 Id. at 929.  
126
 Id.  
127
 Id.   
20 
 
ordinance would pass constitutional muster under the O’Brien test, even if suppression of speech 
was a motivating factor in the ordinance’s enactment provided the governments predominate 
concerns were secondary effects and not the speech content.
128
   
 The Renton Court may have foreclosed governmental motivation as a decisive factor but 
failed to blunt Justice Brennan’s cogent legal counterpoint that zoning regulation of adult 
businesses was inescapably based on the speech’s content irrespective of whether they aimed to 
combat harmful secondary effects.
129
  In particular, Justice Brennan pointed out that ‘“other 
forms of adult entertainment”’ were not subject to the same restrictions as adult movie theaters 
under the Renton ordinance.
130
  This disparate treatment of particular kinds of speech amounted 
to flagrant content-discrimination, requiring strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for 
zoning regulations of sexual communicative conduct.
131
  In Young, the Supreme Court jettisoned 
disentanglement of the thorny distinction between the conduct and speech components of 
symbolic expression.
132
  On this point, the Renton Court only convinced critics that the conduct-
content based distinction issue would remain unresolved. 
 Five years later the Court aggressively upended the conduct-content based distinction but 
outside the zoning context in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
133
  The Barnes line of cases involved a 
distinct breed of conduct regulation of adult businesses.  In Barnes, the Indiana State Legislature 
sought to enforce its public indecency statute against two strip clubs that featured totally nude 
dancing and served alcohol.
134
  The indecency statute required “that the dancers wear ‘pasties’ 
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and ‘G-strings’ when they dance.”135  The two strip club owners challenged the statute on the 
grounds that prohibiting the performance of nude dancing impermissibly infringed on their First 
Amendment rights in symbolic expression.
136
  In addition, the strip club respondents carefully 
distinguished between time, place, and manner restrictions on adult businesses and government 
imposed limits on conduct that qualifies as symbolic expression protected by the First 
Amendment.
137
   
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, analyzed the statute under the O’Brien 
test, noting that the Renton test embodied “much the same standards as those set forth in 
[O’Brien].”138  On that doctrinal basis, the plurality concluded that the Indiana statute fell within 
the purview of state police power to protect morality and the public order.
139
  Conduct statutes 
designed to mitigate the harmful effects of conduct that threatened the public order or morality 
justifiably placed incidental curbs on symbolic expression.
140
  This reasoning mirrored the broad 
secondary effects pretext on which the government could rely in passage of zoning regulation of 
adult businesses.
141
  Instead of elucidating the boundary line between conduct and content in 
symbolic expression, the Barnes plurality expanded the scope of the secondary effects doctrine 
into unprecedented legal terrain—the non-zoning context.142  The Barnes decision empowered 
states with the constitutional authority to directly regulate conduct in adult businesses 
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irrespective of the free speech implications or of any burden of proof to substantiate the content-
neutrality of the conduct statute.
143
  
 Justice Scalia’s concurrence agreed almost entirely with the plurality’s legal conclusions, 
but differed on the proper standard of review.
144
  For Justice Scalia, nude dancing regulation not 
only warranted state regulation, but also required judicial deference to legislative prerogatives.  
The Court, Justice Scalia wrote, “should avoid wherever possible . . . a method of analysis that 
requires judicial assessment of the ‘importance’ of government interests—and especially of 
government interests in various aspects of morality.”145 
 Justice Souter’s concurrence, however, reached the same legal conclusion on different 
grounds.  Justice Souter assumed the more difficult analytical undertaking of responding to 
Justice White’s dissenting point that public indecency statutes are inherently content-based, as 
they are aimed to limit symbolic speech because of its content.
146
  Justice Souter countered with 
two points.  First, the nudity aspect of dance performance does not subtract from the expressive 
communicative quality freely conveyed in that form of expression.
147
  Second, the fact that the 
legislature’s rationale for passing the statute is correlated with effects generated by the existence 
of adult businesses does not mean such statutes are content-based.
148
  If the regulation is 
“‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’”149 in other words, the 
statute is content-neutral.  Justice Souter, citing to the Court’s reasoning in Renton, added that 
under the O’Brien analysis the government’s evidentiary burden did not include an affirmative 
obligation to prove the existence of secondary effects in its city in particular.
150
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 The Court’s subsequent opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul151 flew under the radar, as it 
did not involve any state regulation of adult businesses.  R.A.V. involved a constitutional 
challenge to a statutory provision that criminalized derogatory verbal or symbolic speech aimed 
at persons “‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”152  Writing for the plurality, 
Justice Scalia struck down the statute, but a kernel of his reasoning implicated First Amendment 
concerns for state regulation of adult businesses.
153
  Justice Scalia concluded that the government 
could not discriminate against particular kinds of proscribable speech and not others.
154
  For our 
purposes, Justice Scalia reasoned that secondary effects provided a valid basis on which to 
classify certain speech as containing proscribable content.
155
  Therefore, the government could 
pass regulations that constitutionally discriminate against particular kinds of speech carrying 
negative secondary effects “because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”156   
 The expansion of secondary effects reached its apogee in R.A.V.  Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning suggested that speech producing harmful secondary effects was tantamount to other 
categories of speech not afforded First Amendment protections such as libel and obscenity.
157
  
To be fair, Justice Scalia may not have meant that speech engendering secondary effects 
constituted a new category of unprotected speech.  The thrust of his reasoning, however, strongly 
indicated that courts should treat conduct and zoning state regulations of adult businesses as a 
category receiving no First Amendment protection.
158
  Although the Court refused to take the 
secondary effects reasoning as far as denying the protected status of adult speech,
159
 the Court’s 
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vague evidence rule in Renton and the expansion of secondary effects into non-zoning cases 
suggested the Court’s willingness to permit the state expansive power to regulate adult 
businesses with feeble limitations.
160
 
 The Court retrenched its secondary effects analysis in non-zoning cases eight years later 
in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.161  The facts of Erie were virtually identical to Barnes.  In Erie, a 
strip club owner operating a nude dancing club challenged a Pennsylvania Ordinance enacted by 
the City of Erie.
162
  The ordinance required dancers to wear, “at a minimum, ‘pasties’ and a ‘G-
string.’”163  The language of the ordinance broadly encompassed any nudity in public places, 
which included “all buildings and enclosed places owned by or open to the general public,…such 
places of entertainment, taverns, restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance halls, banquet halls, party 
rooms or halls limited to specific members, restricted to adults or to patrons invited to attend, 
whether or not an admission charge is levied.”164   
 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, amplified the secondary effects analysis 
nascent in Barnes.
165
  The Erie plurality referenced the facts of O’Brien throughout the opinion 
to demonstrate that if the Court curbed anti-war political speech in the name of furthering a 
governmental interest, the Court refused to carve out an exception for nude dancing in strip 
clubs, which is lower value symbolic expression.
166
  Justice O’Connor held further that the 
government’s evidentiary burden for proving whether the regulation furthers an important 
governmental interest is judged under the broad Renton reasonable-relevance standard.
167
  The 
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plurality in Erie essentially applied the opaque evidence rule from its analysis in Young, Schad, 
and Renton to non-zoning statutes in Barnes and Erie.
168
   
 For evidence purposes, Barnes and Erie failed to mark a watershed moment in the 
Court’s clarification of the evidence rule established in Renton.169  The opinions, however, 
represented a significant doctrinal expansion of the secondary effects justification in the state’s 
ability to directly regulate expressive conduct as well as time, place, and manner of operation of 
adult businesses.
170
  Furthermore, although silent in expounding on the meaning of the Renton 
evidence rule, the Barnes, R.A.V., and Erie decisions highlighted the integral part that a clear 
evidence rule plays in protecting the First Amendment rights of adult speech from potent 
governmental power.   
 Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Erie alluded to this same concern.  
Justice Souter sharply disagreed with the plurality’s legal conclusions because “the record before 
us today is deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either 
for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy.”171  The 
plurality, in other words, rubber stamped the Erie City Council’s “speculative supposition” 
without the benefit of any “demonstrated fact.”172  Justice Souter’s opinion underscored the 
meekness that opacity produced in the Renton evidence rule, and the need to clarify the rule to 
protect adult businesses’ protected speech.  
III.    The Unclear Evidentiary Standard for Proving Substantial Governmental  
          Interest: Alameda Books 
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 The Supreme Court’s renewed opportunity to squarely and directly address the vague 
Renton evidence rule arrived in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books
173
 three years after Erie 
and seventeen years after Renton.  In Alameda, two adult business owners operating two 
businesses—an arcade and bookstore— in a single building unit challenged the revised 
ordinance that the operation of more than one adult business in the same building.
174
  The Ninth 
Circuit Court, much as it did in Renton, concluded that the city failed to “demonstrate that the 
prohibition was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest.”175  In particular, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the city failed to adduce sufficient evidence on which it could reasonably rely 
to “demonstrate a link between multiple-use adult establishments and negative secondary 
effects.”176   
 The Alameda Court produced another plurality opinion split in their approach to the 
government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial governmental interest.  The opinions 
can be categorized into three competing approaches.  First, Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
plurality, articulated a burden-shifting mechanism in which plaintiff-adult businesses could “cast 
direct doubt” on the government’s adduced evidence supporting its secondary effects 
justification.
177
  Plaintiffs casted direct doubt on the city’s rationale “by demonstrating that the 
municipality’s evidence does not support its rationale, or by furnishing evidence that disputes the 
municipality’s factual findings.”178  If the plaintiff fails to cast direct doubt, the government 
satisfies the Renton reasonable-relevance standard.
179
 
 If the plaintiff succeeds, on the other hand, in casting direct doubt on the government’s 
rationale, the burden shifts back to the government to offer additional evidence “renewing 
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support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”180  Justice O’Connor reinforced, however, the 
Court’s holding in Renton that the government’s evidentiary burden did not include conducting 
its own empirical studies.
181
   
 Further, the government’s evidentiary burden also excluded “providing evidence that 
rules out every theory for the link between concentrations of adult establishments that is 
inconsistent with its own.”182  The plurality also stated that the government could rely on 
evidence obtained after the original ordinance passed but preceded revision of the ordinance.
183
  
Besides the burden shifting mechanism, the plurality also provided that a municipality could not 
rely on “shoddy data or reasoning” to support its rationale.184 
 The plurality’s evidence formulation is flawed in three key respects.  First, the burden 
shifting mechanism remained silent as to how courts should weigh the plaintiff’s rebuttal 
evidence casting direct doubt on the government’s rationale.  More importantly, the plurality also 
failed to address the type or form of evidence that a plaintiff could adduce to cast direct doubt 
upon the government’s rationale.  The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden on rebuttal, in other words, 
remained unclear.   
 Second, the timing of evidence on which the government could not rely was left 
unresolved by the plurality.  No less than the scope of permissible evidence was at stake. The 
plurality deficient explanation did not articulate a clear timeline of evidence.  The government 
could clearly rely on pre-enactment evidence, but how far back and did older evidence or data 
carry less evidentiary weight than fresher evidence or data.  Moreover, the plurality failed to 
address whether the government could rely on evidence or data obtained after enactment of the 
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ordinance.  Similarly, even if the government could rely on post-enactment evidence or data, the 
degree of evidentiary weight to be accorded different evidence over time was unclear.   
 Third, the “shoddy data or reasoning” requirement raised a hullabaloo of disagreement 
and confusion regarding what the requirement actually meant.
185
   The plurality created a 
category without explaining the criteria for qualification or disqualification.  At the very least, 
the Court seemed to suggest that “shoddy data or reasoning” included evidence completely 
unrelated to the purported secondary effects ailing the particular community.  Suggestions of 
law, however, compounded an already unclear evidence rule.  
 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion sought to clarify how courts should properly 
measure the government’s evidentiary burden.  Justice Kennedy formulized a cost-benefit 
approach or balancing test that weighed whether a given ordinance substantially reduced speech 
in the name of mitigating secondary effects.
186
  Justice Kennedy predicated this approach on two 
legal questions.  First, “what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a 
secondary effects ordinance?”187  Second, “how much evidence is required to support the 
proposition?”188  On the appropriate proposition, Justice Kennedy concluded that “a city must 
advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing 
secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact.” 189  
 This formulation aimed to address the encroaching and enlarging scope of acceptable 
evidence on which governments could rely to substantiate their secondary effects justification.  
Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach, in other words, sought to reign in governmental 
reliance on thinly veiled attempts at overt regulation without strong evidentiary support.  The 
broadening scope of admissible evidence, no matter how unrelated, began to water down the 
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purpose of having an evidence rule.  The problem with Justice Kennedy’s formulation, however, 
is that reads more like a template for writing ordinance language that will more likely overcome 
constitutional challenges.   
 On the second proposition, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence falls way short.  The 
sufficiency of evidence that the government must produce, Justice Kennedy insists, is explained 
in the Renton rule.  The Court must accorded broad judicial deference to legislative rationale.  
Citing to Renton and similar to Justice Scalia’s position in Barnes, Justice Kennedy wrote, [a]s a 
general matter, courts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical 
assessments of city planners.  The Los Angeles City Council knows the streets of Lose Angeles 
better than we do.”   
 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is defective in two key aspects.  First, the concurrence 
conflates the sufficiency of asserting a related secondary effect with sufficiency of evidence in 
proving a substantial governmental interest.  The cost-benefit approach is a reformulation of the 
narrow tailoring requirement in Schad.  Second, the concurring opinion, similarly, punted on the 
question of the timing of evidence, the weight of evidence, the type or form of admissible 
evidence, and how much evidence is sufficient to defeat an ordinance.   
 Justice Souter’s dissent makes two critical points regarding sufficiency of evidence.  
First, Justice Souter begins on the premise that zoning regulation of adult businesses is “content-
correlated.”  Zoning regulations of adult businesses, in other words, have a “correlation with 
secondary effects.”  Second, as such, the sufficiency of evidence standard should also require a 
correlation between the purported secondary effects in a community and the particular type of 
operation of adult businesses in the community that gives rise to these alleged secondary effects.   
 
IV.     An Unclear Evidentiary Standard Emboldens Invasive State Zoning Regulation 
          In the Spirit of Barnes and Erie 
 
30 
 
 In the wake of Alameda’s unclear evidence standard, lower courts and commentators are 
split over what constitutes sufficient evidence to sustain or rebut the substantial governmental 
interest prong under Renton.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Daytona Grand, Inc. v. 
City of Daytona Beach,
190
 for example, reversed the District Court’s finding that the city relied 
heavily on “pre-enactment evidence [consisting] either of purely anecdotal evidence or opinions 
based on highly unreliable data.”191  The District Court construed Alameda’s “shoddy data or 
reasoning” sufficiency of evidence standard to exclude anecdotal evidence such as reliance on 
testimony from past and present law enforcement officials and appropriately comparable control 
studies for secondary effects.
192
  
 The Eleventh Circuit sharply disagreed with the lower court’s reading of Alameda, 
explaining that the Alameda Court did not raise the evidentiary bar “or [require] a city to justify 
its ordinances with empirical evidence or scientific studies.”193   The Daytona Court concluded 
further that anecdotal evidence sufficiently sustains an adult ordinance and that empirical studies 
are not required as part of the city’s evidentiary burden under Alameda.194   
 The Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence has paralleled the Eleventh Circuit’s view on 
sufficiency of evidence until its most recent 2009 decision in Annex Books v. City of 
Indianapolis.
195
  In Annex, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority measured the city’s 
sufficiency of evidence under Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach.  The revised ordinance 
expanded the amount of retail stores subject to zoning regulation as adult businesses.
196
  The 
ordinance increased the number of retail stores by decreasing the threshold of adult material 
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inventory sold in the store necessary to come within the statute’s scope.197  Judge Easterbrook 
soundly rejected the government’s position that “any empirical study of morals offenses near any 
kind of adult establishment in any city justifies every possible kind of legal restriction in every 
city.”198  The Annex Court, in other words, rejected the city’s reading of Alameda that any and 
every study from other cities qualified as sufficient evidence.   
 The Annex decision reflected the Seventh Circuit’s concern that city governments would 
read Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Alameda as a template for writing proper language in the 
ordinance to support its rationale and pass constitutional muster.  Annex represents a yield sign 
more than a stop sign about the scope of evidence on which governments may rely to support its 
rationale under Alameda.  
 
V.        Not All Secondary Effects Are Created or Equal: Establishing Rules of Comparability In 
  Alameda Books Evidence Standard 
 
 The Alameda evidence standard should adopt a rule of comparability standard regarding 
the sufficiency of evidence on which the government may rely.  A recent study conducted an 
empirical comparison of purported secondary effects and the purported results produced in the 
community.
199
 Justice Souter and Judge Easterbrook’s opinions in Alameda and Annex, 
respectively, lay out the blueprint for an evidence standard that reign the broad scope of 
unrelated evidence on which the government may rely.  The government should not shoulder the 
burden of producing new empirical studies of its own. But the government should be required to 
adduce evidence that tracks closely with the type of secondary effects its ordinance is designed 
to combat.  This rule of comparable data or evidence as a requirement for sufficient evidence 
balances the interests of the government in protecting the community from actual negative 
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externalities produced by operation of adult businesses near schools or churches against the First 
Amendment speech rights of adult business owners.   
   
VI.    Conclusion  
 
 The United States Supreme Court has steadily expanded the writ of state and municipal 
regulatory authority over adult businesses.
200
  In its wake, the Court’s decisions defanged First 
Amendment protections of adult businesses, conflated the applicability of the secondary effects 
doctrine in non-zoning cases, and confused lower courts’ understanding of the proper evidentiary 
burden for proving a substantial governmental interest.  Judicial expansion of state and municipal 
regulatory power over adult businesses has increasingly paved the way for legislative morality as 
states began passage of conduct statutes aimed at the sexual content adult businesses are 
selling.
201
  A more balanced and efficient regulatory approach contemplates rules of comparable 
relatedness when it comes to the government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial 
governmental interest.  
 Rules of comparable relatedness can narrow the inconsistency in lower court 
interpretations of Alameda’s evidence standard which has become the basis for legislative abuse 
in adult zoning regulation.  Protection of our families and communities is an essential legislative 
prerogative.  But protection must be proportional to the threat and the threat must be fairly 
measured by a clear evidence standard that does not transform protection of the community into 
a legislative license to oppress First Amendment protected speech to which adult businesses are 
entitled.  
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